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1. Summary 
The African Development Bank publication ‘African Economic Outlook 2019’, urges policy 
makers to implement the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to reduce the time it takes 
to cross borders and the transaction costs tied to non-tariff measures. When added to the 
removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, these measures could yield a cumulative income gain of 
3.5% of Africa’s GDP or just over US$100 billion.i Against this backdrop, this rapid literature 
review contends that the combination of economic opportunity, trade law commitment and 
government mindfulness of reputational standing will squeeze the space in which negative forces 
within political elites can in respect of self-interest, act to maintain the status quo and 
complacency towards reforms1.  
This convergence of opportunity is providing a set of circumstances under which development 
partners can engage with key private and public sector institutions coalescing around the 
imperatives of cooperation and collaboration as embodied in international and regional trade 
agreements. This review also highlights the potential for public and private sector collaborative 
bodies such as National Trade Facilitation Committees (NTFC) to become increasingly catalytic 
in leading government engagement with the vast informal cross-border trade sector in which 
marginalised groups such as woman traders and SMEs operate out of rural locations.  
This review finds evidence of countries successfully translating the trade liberalisation narrative 
into national action where it has been anchored to strong political will, empowered institutions, an 
enabling legal framework, and a well-defined and sufficiently financed national development 
strategy. In this regard, the study cites Rwanda as a positive reference point for progress where 
as a post conflict nation, its achievements in trade reform (notwithstanding concerns over cases 
of restriction of free speech and political activityii) are evident in the rise in global rankings across 
a range of performance indices (where it is significantly outpacing its regional partners in the 
East African Communities).  
As a counterpoint to the situation in Rwanda, the case of Nigeria is also considered where the 
political economy until now has been reticent to the signing of the African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement (AfCFTA). This is suggestive of the complex and difficult environment in which to 
achieve trade related reforms and an equally difficult entry point for donors to navigate and 
operate in.iii  
The circumstances of these two countries may be considered as representative of two ends of a 
complex political economy spectrum in Africa that nevertheless has some value as a benchmark 
for determining the evolving Political Economy at play within the region more broadly. In this 
respect, the value of referencing international performance indicators remains relevant for 
framing the current national political economy vectors and for gauging the extent of the potential 
impact that key institutions involved in trade could have on the reform agenda in the future.  
The limited extent of available open source literature makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions, 
as to the precise nature of the interplay between the key institutions in government and the 
private sector in the trade space. However, the examples provided in this review point not only to 
                                                   
1 Adeolu (2016:30) considers how the preference of political elites for special status and power translates to an 
institutional structure that not only maximises their relative share of social wealth through predation but ensure 
they keep as wide as possible the gap between actual development and potential development. 
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valuable lessons already learned, but also those yet to be learned as government agencies 
transition to new working modalities and as economies open up to new possibilities. For 
example, the growth of e-Commerce and the gig economy such as in Kenya, where new 
opportunities for small and informal traders are being driven from the bottom up by entrepreneurs 
using Apps and smartphone technologies that has the potential to facilitate inter regional trade.iv 
v. A key example is the M-PESA mobile payment system currently active in Kenya and Tanzania. 
The system is helping to meet the needs of the rapid growth of cross border trade relations and 
the remittance industry in East Africa allowing access to finance opportunities and a cost 
effective and convenient channel of international money transfervi. 
The need for developing countries’ institutions to be responsive to change is essential to ensure 
the so called ‘digital divide’ does not turn into a gulf of inequality in developing countries. This 
recognises that the process of regional economic integration in Africa will involve expanding 
access to e-Government services in trade e.g. national Electronic Single Window and Trade 
Information Portals, to ensure technology does not in itself become a barrier to trade i.e. 
restricted to well-educated elites and large businesses based in metropolitan areas.  
Furthermore, the move towards establishing highly collaborative border arrangements across 
agencies e.g. One Stop Border Posts, Joint Risk Management Committees and National Trade 
Facilitation Committees, offer a promising point of focus for international development to support 
inclusivity and optimise buy-in to the reform process. This particularly considers how such 
institutions, from the point at which they become established, can create new channels for 
collaboration with marginalised groups operating within the informal sector as well as Civil 
Society actors. The level of stakeholder inclusion in the Kenya NTFC arrangement (currently 59 
stakeholdersvii) points to this potential across other developing economies as Governments react 
to the meet their regional commitments (e.g. TFA and AfCFTA).  
Yet, collaboration remains one of the most difficult of the TFA provisions to implement according 
to development notifications to the WTO by Least Developed Countries. In terms of how this 
might fit into a Theory of Change, the thinking goes that if pro-development elite factions  – 
usually an educated middle class or entrepreneurial class - become more powerful and better 
organised, as has been the case in Asia, they are more likely to be brought into the political 
settlement and influence the direction of trade facilitation and institutional governanceviii.   
In the first instance, the international development community can use its influence within the 
national political economy context to ensure national commitments on private and public sector 
collaboration can succeed over the long-term2. The potential pathways that would make national 
institutions more impactful are set out as a number of discreet, but inter-linked interventions in 
Section 2 of this review. This includes supporting the development of project management skills 
for senior and middle managers in Ministries of Trade, NTFCs and border agencies. This would 
increase the chances of implementing an ambitious programme of change management 
activities under the TFA.  
As the TFA moves from ratification to implementation status, this review also suggests that there 
is currently space for raising levels of accountability in institutions for delivering positive 
                                                   
2 ‘the ability to influence the behaviour and thinking of others through the power of attraction and ideas’ 
Australian Government Foreign Policy White Paper 2017 see https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-
white-paper 
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outcomes of trade reforms and to prevent capacity ‘backsliding’ i.e. slippage back to former 
opaque and bureaucratic practices. This considers that to a large extent, the TFA relies on 
member states undertaking a self-assessment process of national readiness for implementation 
of new best practices measures included in the agreement. Strengthening oversight functions of 
government agencies’ internal audit branches as well as national audit offices, for example, 
through piloting the adoption of the UK law enforcement decision rationale methodology (e.g. 
SAFCORM3) in key government institutions in developing countries, provide a novel means of 
reducing arbitrary and unlawful actions. Introducing additional checks and balances on managers 
and staff exercising statutory would be applied as part of a proportionate and structure process 
e.g. as a management assurance check over the granting of tax exemptions as well as the 
detention/confiscation of goods, levying of fines and penalties.ix  
2. Introduction  
This rapid literature review addresses two related questions posed by DFID set in the context of 
exploring the relationship between governance, institutions and growth in the international 
development space: 
1. Which institutions in developing countries tend to be the most important/effective for 
translating trade into development impact across society? 
2. Under what circumstances can donors contribute to reforming these institutions in order 
to achieve increased development impact from trade? 
DFID is striving to ensure its economic development work can better take into account the role of 
politics and power in determining economic development processes. This K4D helpdesk report 
should contribute to this understanding, specifically on DFID’s economic development work 
focused on trade and he relationship between the private sector and the political settlement in 
partner countries. 
The methodology was carried out by undertaking a desk-based review of existing open source 
literature. This literature is from a wide range of subject relevant reports, published by 
development partners and the outputs of other Non-Governmental and Civil Society 
Organisations. It also draws upon the author’s own experience as a customs and trade 
facilitation expert supporting and mentoring border agency personnel at a strategic and 
operational level in developing countries. The report attempts to answer the questions by taking 
the long view of developments in international trade, but principally focusing on the Sub-Saharan 
African outlook given that this region is of keen focus of HMG’s Aid-for-Trade (AfT) strategy.  
Examined here is the evidence of non-uniform shifts in policy and behaviour at the national level 
in developing countries, which can be linked to the burgeoning global and regional narrative 
around the simplification and transparency of moving goods across international borders and 
how this represents a stimulus for inclusive economic growth and poverty alleviation. Now, the 
Africa region is witnessing a convergence of multiple external influencers of change. The 
significant multi-lateral WTO TFA, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the African Union’s 
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process. S=Situation; A=Aims; F=Factors; C=Choices; O=Options; R=Risks; M=Monitoring  
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Agenda 2063 and the G20 Compact with Africa are all initiatives that represent a combination of 
obligations, best endeavour commitments and external investment incentives.  
Increasingly, and to varying degrees, the narrative of opportunity these initiatives represent are 
being woven into the regional and national strategic thinking and policies on trade liberalisation in 
the African region. Furthermore, this review contends that political economies across Africa are 
shifting towards a reformist agenda is being demonstrated by the rate of take up of international 
and regional agreements. Not least of these is the AfCFTA, one of the most rapid inter-
governmental agreements ever to come into force on the Continent.x This come with the 
knowledge that such agreements contain multiple references relating to partner agency and 
country collaboration, but also contain dispute clauses that potentially open countries up to 
unprecedented levels of external scrutiny and accountability over the implementation of more 
transparent and simplified processes in the facilitation of trade.  
 
3. Impactful institutions in trade: an overview 
This section considers research findings that are suggestive of the way in which a convergence 
of international and regional initiatives in trade, and the rising potential they have for increasing 
external scrutiny and oversight over the way they are being implemented, is impacting on the 
vectors of political economy evolution in developing countries. A key contention of this review is 
that key institutions within the private and public sector will inevitably be impacted by policy shifts 
aligned to a growing acceptance of the liberalised trade narrative at the governmental level 
(notwithstanding lingering concerns in some countries e.g. Nigeria, over protection of their 
internal markets and industries). This process of transition may be variously challenging for the 
institutions mention in this review which present opportunities for development partners to grow 
and sustain their influence through capacity building. The common entry point is through 
exploiting collaborative mechanisms inextricably build into regional and international agreements 
such as the WTO TFA (Article 8) and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (Annex 4)4. 
This review accepts the view that the feasibility of different policy approaches will be determined 
by a country’s political settlement. The concept of political settlement rests on the fact that 
institutions matter, and the way institutions work is shaped by non-institutional factors, especially 
the power distribution among major elements of the national elite. According to Parks and Cole 
(2010), political settlements are inherently difficult to evaluate and monitor where they are based 
on informal relationships and rules that are rarely written down often appearing opaque to most 
international actors. Many of the critical factors are complex and difficult to measure, such as 
perceptions and drivers of legitimacy, or the interest calculations of powerful elite actors5.   
Recognising the complex dynamics at play within the diverse political economies in which trade 
Agreements, such as the WTO TFA and the AfCTFA are being implemented, inevitably these 
forces will react and respond according to their own ‘rules of the game’ within the national, and 
local contexts. In some cases, depending on the culture of compliance, this involves ‘breaking 
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5 https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/PoliticalSettlementsFINAL.pdf page 43 
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the rules’. For example, in countries where there are high levels of corruption, and a culture of 
this rule breaking emerges, such as in Nigeria, the complexities of overcoming this informal 
institution of breaking the rules is highly detrimental to achieving inclusive development through 
trade and the ability to move towards FTA regulation implementation (ECDMP, 2019). 
In contrast, Rwanda has arrived at a political settlement that is conducive to development where 
it has been possible for policy to evolve and play out as part of a coherent long-term strategic 
perspective based on an iterative, adaptive, problem solving way. One of the elements is a 
remarkable level of power-sharing among legally recognised parties. The Oversees Development 
Institute (ODI) allude to this type of political settlement as being at the high end of the 
governance spectrum being anchored to an inclusive, coordinated, impersonal arrangement6.   
DFID (2017) notes that a capable state and committed political leadership can drive economic 
transformation and manage the tensions it presents. This includes providing predictability and 
transparency; the right business environment and economic infrastructure; and clear direction 
over trade and investment policies7. This posit may be used as a benchmark against which the 
proactive and reactive stances taken by different developing country governments towards trade 
facilitation and liberalisation can be measured, informing potential entry points for development 
partner engagement with institutions in the trade space.  
This paper contends that the closer regional integration brought about through governments’ 
committing to implementing trade agreements8 in combination with the array of global 
performance benchmark indices and the associated mechanisms of oversight, means that the 
space for playing the rules of the game as they once were played i.e. without challenge, is being 
squeezed. Mehta and Walton (2014: 30) interpret the shift change in the political settlement as 
being the “product of the confluence of a changing cognitive map of state elites, and an evolving, 
rather than a radical, shift in the relationship with business interests”.  
This may be interpreted as a reorientation of the political economy in many developing countries 
towards accepting and taking action on reform, albeit at variously different speeds. This is 
reflected in the international performance indices and the level of ratification of key trade 
instruments such as the TFA and AfCFTA. Well-publicised Regional economic success stories 
(like Rwanda) may also be contributing to a ‘gravitational pull’ on regional partners that can 
shape political economies and their institutions at the national level. Matthias and Staeger (2019) 
liken the AfCFTA’s rapid ratification to countries responding to peer pressure to “jump on the 
train before it leaves the station and who is the best pan-Africanist”9.  
                                                   
6 https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10185.pdf 
7 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/822011487174249256/DFID-Economic-Development-Strategy-2017.pdf page 
25 
8 e.g. through AfCFTA, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), 
COMESA tri-partite agreement 
9 https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135 
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Assessing the Potential Gravitational Pull of Converging Regional 
and International Trade Initiatives on National Political Economies. 
International Performance Indices  
In the narrow sense, institutions have been described as the organisational map of decision 
making at the junction where politics and public policy meet business and society. On trade 
policy, this map is much more complicated than it used to be. Trade policy is no longer just about 
a clutch of border instruments, and the preserve of trade ministries. It is increasingly ‘trade-
related’, a matter of non-border regulation reaching deep into the domestic economy and its 
institutions. 
However, against this backdrop of complexity, the general lack of open source information on the 
way the political economy interacts and effects institutions and vice versa in the trade space 
presents difficulties in reaching clarity, where the role of institutions and governance has not yet 
been formalised as part of intelligible trade theory10. Therefore, referencing international trade, 
governance and transparency indices becomes a useful (and necessary) exercise in 
understanding how the opportunities for institutions to become more impact may be increasing 
as a result of the developing dynamic of international trade and AfT.  
According to Kelley and Simmons (2015), Global Performance Indices (GPIs) are exercises in 
social power that interact with the status of the country being ranked in the broader international 
community11. For the purposes of this review, relevant GPIs might include inter alia OECD’s 
Trade Facilitation Indicators, World Bank Logistics Performance Index and Ease of Doing 
Business index [Trading Across Borders], but also Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
data (CPIA). Under such circumstances, these indicators can mobilise and inform domestic 
actors, embarrass specific policy makers, and sometimes even activate other transnational 
pressure and move markets12. Colombia, Malaysia and the Russian Federation provide 
examples of where economies are reputation sensitive to external assessment having formed 
regulatory reform committees that use the Doing Business indicators as one input to inform their 
programmes for improving the business environment13.  
Since the inception of the Trading Across Borders [TAB] indicator in 2004, 119 of the 190 
economies currently monitored [by the World Bank] have implemented a total of 264 reforms to 
improve the efficiency of trade facilities. The most commonly implemented reforms include the 
adoption of e-systems to enable electronic processing of trade procedures; implementation of 
                                                   
10  Mashura and Makochekanwa 2018 
11 https://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=country-policy-and-institutional-assessment# 
12 https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/workshop%2014-15/Kelley__Simmons_EDB_22Mar15v2.pdf (page 8) 
13 http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-
version.pdf page 29 
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risk-based inspections; elimination of redundant procedures to increase the efficiency of customs 
administration; and improvements in customs/border infrastructure14 (World Bank, 2018). 
Seen through the lens of international governance performance indices, low and unchanging 
rankings allude to the scale of the challenge faced with transitioning from a broadly positive 
stance on trade to actually managing the consistent and collaborative implementation of a 
multiplicity of new trade facilitative processes affecting many government agencies (not only 
customs). The transition is not merely about capacity building, finance and political will, but also 
the result of national interests and bargaining processes that are continually in flux. For example, 
the politics of member states in Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa can be at 
cross-purposes to regional [and international] commitments. Where trade agreements have been 
signed by Heads of State committing a country to implementing region wide changes at the 
national level, this may also produce winners and losers in the process15.  
This recognises that entire economic sectors and communities can be heavily affected by the 
downsides of multi-lateral trade agreements involving developing economies, particularly when 
existing social protections are weak, and informal markets dominate many sectors. The question 
that a more focused political economy analysis may be able to answer is how will governments 
manage reform commitments if it results in wage cuts, unemployment, environmental 
degradation, revenue loss from customs duties and hurts some of their businesses and state 
companies?16  
However, it is argued that a successful governance process, which can engage with the full 
range of political interests, would be one that can link the delivery of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) that are capable of synergy, but also negotiate trade-offs to optimise 
delivery of goals that are in conflict17. This recognises that there will be winners and losers in the 
adoption of trade liberalising measures such as the TFA and that assistance maybe required to 
bring on-board vested stakeholder interest groups who stand to be affected. For example, pre-
shipment inspection companies, customs brokers and ministries of finance affected by loss of 
revenue or jobs, will require support that is time-bound, with a clear exit strategy, and incentives 
to adjust and innovate; aimed at redeploying displaced workers; compatible with general safety 
net arrangements that are transparent and accountable18.  
The question of impactful institutions (or their potential to impact) should also be viewed through 
the imperatives for national action arising from the coming into force of the TFA in combination 
with the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015)19. In terms of ramping up the 
                                                   
14 http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/wto-s-trade-facilitation-agreement-and-doing-business-reforms-are-
they-related-and-how 
15 Adapted from Byiers et al May 2019 
16 Ibid 19 (adapted)  
17 https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/20749/1/ch9.pdf page 80 and 87 
18 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/wtos-trade-facilitation-agreement-why-should-african-than-mena/ 
19 The Action Agenda establishes a strong foundation to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. It provides a new global framework for financing sustainable development by aligning 
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narrative, key international bodies (e.g. UNCTAD) have been active in mapping and promoting 
the linkages between these initiatives across development partners and beneficiaries20.  
In the African context, two more elements fit into this in this dynamic. Firstly, the African Union’s 
Agenda 2063, linked to the global SDGs, is providing a powerful policy narrative on poverty 
alleviation and economic sustainable economic growth. Secondly, the AfCTFA, described as 
‘pivotal and catalytic’21, is due to come into force (July 2019) and under which ratifying states will 
be accountable for its implementation. Thirdly, the G20 Compact with Africa (CwA) provides an 
example of a high-level initiative where reform minded regional Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) are being encouraged to make substantial improvements of the macro, business and 
financing frameworks as a means of promoting private investment in Africa. Since its launch in 
2017, twelve African countries have joined the initiative22.  
At the RECs level, the identification, removal and monitoring of Non-Tariff Barriers to trade by the 
member states is one of the priority areas for policy harmonisation and coordination being acted 
upon by governments under the EAC/COMESA/SADC Tripartite framework. With tariff 
liberalisation largely achieved, the challenge remains to eliminate non-tariff and other barriers to 
trade. Demonstrating what regional collaboration can achieve, an online reporting mechanism 
has been rolled out. The non-tariff measures database allows traders to report the existence and 
nature of non-tariff barriers applied by member states23.  
Four of the five EAC members - Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda – collaborate on matters 
to do with transit, transport, customs control, documentation and procedures and the 
development of infrastructure related to sea ports, inland ports and waterways, roads, railways, 
pipelines and border posts along the Northern Corridor, which links the landlocked EAC countries 
with the Kenyan port of Mombasa. Here there is an alignment of political interests between the 
landlocked EAC member states - especially Uganda and Rwanda and the interests of politically 
influential Kenyan businesses in securing increased access to regional markets. In turn, this has 
generated tensions, with concerns in Tanzania that the Northern Corridor’s focus on the Port of 
Mombasa provides competition to Tanzania’s ports for control of regional transit markets24.    
In March 2017, Consultations at the EAC Level on harmonisation of the trade facilitation 
measures were concluded, a regional action plan developed and agreed upon. The EAC 
Secretariat is coordinating the implementation of the TFA without prejudice to any of the partner 
state’s programmes. TFA measures that are regional in nature will be undertaken jointly to derive 
synergy. The size of gains from trade liberalisation differs across countries depending on the 
type of liberalisation pursued. Hence, countries are unlikely to have the same strategic objectives 
                                                   
all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities (UN Sustainable Development 
Goals Knowledge Platform) 
20 https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/Trade-Analysis/TAB-Trade-and-SDGs.aspx 
21 https://www.ids.trade/files/africa_fta.pdf 
22 These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Togo and Tunisia22. 
23 https://www.tradebarriers.org/about 
24 ECPDM Discussion Paper 202 November 2016 
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when contemplating further integration as the outcomes are likely to be different. This raises 
again the importance of the political economy of the regional integration process. 
Case Study Example: The EAC Simplified Trade Regime (STR)  
The EAC, in cooperation with partner states and the East Africa Trade Hub, has been working to 
eliminate restrictions to the free movement of goods by educating stakeholders through the 
facilitation of cross-border trade workshops in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda targeting the 
inclusivity of women traders who form the bulk of the informal trade sector in border regions. The 
sensitisation workshops have provided a platform to educate traders on their rights under the 
EAC STR, build capacity through business linkages and create trade ties between traders and 
aggregators and processors who will provide a ready market for goods25. 
For example, with other international partners like the USAID funded East African Hub, the EAC 
is overseeing the roll-out of the STR, a provision under the Customs Union that is promoting 
regional integration by easing the requirements of small-scale traders to participate in structured 
cross-border trade  (COMESA launched its STR in 2010 between Malawi and Zambia)26. The 
EAC STR benefits traders through formalising small-scale trade, which leads to increased 
revenue for governments through tax collection. It also simplifies customs procedures enabling 
traders to plan and budget cross-border business transactions.  
However, there have been challenges to the wider uptake of the STR in the Africa region with 
Trade Information Desk Officers (TIDO) reporting: continued lack of awareness and capacity 
amongst potential beneficiary traders; a limited list of eligible goods (not necessarily the ones 
commonly traded); documentary requirements still heavy (SPS, import/export permits, licenses; 
the necessity to pay a transaction processing fee of US$1 and higher; arbitrary enforcement; 
limited presence of TIDOs. STR transactions went down when TIDOs remained underfunded27 
(In Malawi, however, where all three COMESA initiatives were inaugurated, the TIDOs were 
closed due to funding issues28). 
The influence of accountability on institutions in the trade space? 
Institutional quality is regarded as being key to the promotion of trade and catalytic to the process 
of economic growth. Low corruption, effective contract enforcement mechanisms, sound 
regulation and maintaining of efficient public sector administration are all cited as key institutional 
and governance factors that improve trade.29 However, at the institutional level, Pritchett et al 
(2010) note that where institutions in developing countries may superficially take the form of 
                                                   
25 
https://www.eatradehub.org/cross_border_traders_learn_more_about_the_eac_simplified_trade_regime_from_n
ew_guide 
26 
https://www.agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/ICBT%20Gender%20Assessment%20Report_Final_4-
30-2016.pdf page 9 
27 https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/cimem7p20_Mariangela%20Linoci_en.pdf 
28 Ibid 44 page 10 
29 See for example http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/OECD-Recommendation-Public-Integrity.pdf 
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those in functional states, they do not fully play the necessary roles and functions given the lack 
of supporting institutions, accountability and enforcement mechanisms. As such, where the 
potential consequences of non-compliance for member states and their institutions is low, it 
becomes clearer why international and regional agendas often struggle for traction at the national 
level30.  
Nevertheless, the enforcement and accountability that can also ‘push’ states into implementing 
new measures - whether it be to reduce tariffs on regional trade, or the introduction of new 
border management procedures - is available through international and regional trade 
agreements i.e. WTO Agreement (the Special and Differential Treatment arrangements for 
developing countries) and AfCTFA. However, until now, the potency of such mechanisms as a 
means of driving reforms at the national level remains largely untested and particularly regarding 
the conformity of new trade facilitation measures with international best practice.  
The Government of Rwanda for its part has responded positively in this regard having managed 
to put in place strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms, which set clear goals and 
expectations of performance of Rwandan government officials aimed at evaluating outcomes and 
enforcing consequences for underperformance.  Amongst these measures include the Annual 
Leadership Retreat and other public events where Imihigo31 results and (performance) rankings 
are announced and discussed32. Notably, these accountability processes are said to have been 
home-grown with no perception of substantial trade-offs having been made within the power 
elites. This goes with a widespread perception among interviewees that enforcement of 
sanctions in the Rwandan public sector is stringent (Basel Institute of Governance, 2018)33. 
Rwanda and Nigeria, a Contrasting Counterpoint in the Trade 
Liberalisation and the Prospect of the National Political Economy 
Case Study – Rwanda 
As a post conflict land-locked country and Africa’s fourth largest growing economy by GDP34, 
Rwanda is seen as a leading light in SSA for trade facilitation and business regulation. It is also 
said to have the lowest levels of inequality in the EAC35. According to the World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Index, Rwanda ranks at 29th place out of 140 economies for the strength 
of its institutions, the highest in the EAC36. A similar conclusion about the country’s strength of 
                                                   
30 Ibid 3 
31 As part of efforts to reconstruct Rwanda and nurture a shared national identity, the Government of Rwanda 
drew on aspects of Rwandan culture and traditional practices to enrich and adapt its development programs to 
the country’s needs and context. The result is a set of Home-Grown Solutions such as Imihigo, culturally owned 
practices translated into sustainable development programs. https://rwandaguide.info/post-details/imihigo  
32 https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-
01/Rwanda.InformalGovernance.Country%20Report.pdf page 30 
33 Ibid 12 page 25 
34 https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf page 8 
35 Ibid 22  
36 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2018.pdf page 617 
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institutions can be drawn from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators in which it 
significantly outpaces its EAC partners. Similarly, Rwanda also ranks 48th place out of 180 
economies in the Corruptions Perception index way ahead of other countries of the EAC.  
The World Bank in its Economic Review of Rwanda highlights the country’s economic 
development journey as being underpinned by a series of national strategies for transformation 
(NST), which contain detailed sectoral strategies that are aimed at achieving the SDGs. The 
current iteration is NST 1 (2017 – 2024) that sets out many trade related policy commitments 
such a specific policy object to ‘Promote industrial development, export promotion and expansion 
of trade related infrastructure’. 
The Government of Rwanda has set out an ambitious agenda to become a lower middle-income 
country, operating as a service-based hub by the year 2020. Achieving this goal means 
exploiting the opportunities made available with regional integration along with creating a 
dynamic and competitive private sector, for which institutional capacity can flourish37.   
The evolving political economy in Rwanda has allowed the transition to an automated customs 
clearance environment through the development and implementation of the national electronic 
single window system supported by TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This is a highly collaborative effort involving 
34 agencies and has approximately 3000 registered users. This initiative has helped to reduce 
waiting times and costs. Moreover, the National Agricultural Export Development Board of 
Rwanda also introduced an online system, allowing certificates of origin to be issued 
electronically. Furthermore, The World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report for 2019 notes that 
amongst its achievement, Rwanda has managed to reduce the time required to export and 
import by implementing the Single Customs Territory, risk-based inspections and online 
certificates38. 
However, this positive trend towards trade liberalisation, based on the application of technology, 
belies a situation that exposes a potential risk of inequitable gains in the take-up of expanded 
regional and global market opportunities. This considers that In Rwanda, poverty continues to be 
the primary impediment to ICT uptake, especially the internet, with the majority of the population 
engaged in subsistence agriculture. Internet access is concentrated primarily in Kigali and 
remains beyond the reach of many citizens, particularly those in rural areas who are limited by 
low income and low levels of ICT awareness. Only 11 percent of Rwandans are ICT literate, and 
over 70 percent of the population speaks only Kinyarwanda, making internet content in English 
inaccessible to the majority of Rwandansxi.      
Case Study - Nigeria 
The complexities of application of FTAs across the region, due to national contexts in which the 
political economy is not receptive to these reforms, can be outlined through the case of Nigeria. 
A combination of the characteristics of Nigeria have resulted in the current, protectionist, trade 
                                                   
37 http://gov.rw/about-the-government/business-investment/ 
38http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-
version.pdf page 149. 
13 
regime, which has been deemed arbitrary, opaque and sometimes ad hoc with the rank of 183rd 
in the World Bank TAB index (2018).  
Factors affecting this, include the federalised government structure, which has resulted in 
difficulties for reform alongside the domestic opposition from both interest groups and rent-
seekers (Hulse, 2016), and the belief held by many stakeholders that regional trade liberalisation 
threatens Nigeria’s manufacturing sector, which supplies the domestic market. There is no 
strategic trade framework in place, and the country’s national trade policy was last updated in 
2002 and many of Nigeria’s trade-related laws are outdated (WTO, 2017). 
Between the combination of inconsistency in policy, and the government’s failure to implement 
policies properly has meant that an unpredictable trade regime has characterised Nigeria’s trade, 
which has discouraged investment. The country’s economic power (relative to its neighbours) 
provides it with an informal but widely acknowledged ‘veto’ vote. As such, Nigeria has been both 
a key driver and blocker in the regional integration agenda - initially seeking a market for its 
processed goods, the country has turned to a more protective attitude in recent years. The 
Government of Nigeria39, which initially supported the AfCTFA negotiations then made the 
decision to hold off on signing the agreement. The Government cited the need to re-evaluate the 
deal’s impacts and the need to continue consulting with relevant stakeholders on the effects of 
the agreement. However, experts familiar with the situation say that Nigeria will likely join the 
area once national stakeholder buy-in improves40 (see text box). 
Through these rigid set of rules which are difficult to reform, and ruled by political and business 
elites, a separate set of ‘rules of the game’ has emerged, which often revolves around corruption, 
smuggling, and demonstrate a culture in which the rules of the game are ‘breaking the rules’ 
(ECDMP). This can be illustrated by smuggling and corruption evidenced at trade borders. 
Nigerian stakeholders complain that unscrupulous practices in neighbouring countries continue 
to lead to non-ECOWAS goods entering Nigeria under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation 
Scheme (ETLS)41. This smuggling is facilitated by the widespread corruption at border posts, to 
which the Nigerian government “turns a blind eye” or in which it actively participates. According 
to Roy (2017), collusion between traders and customs authorities is widespread, and is 
exacerbated by “politicians who deliberately create restrictions in order to raise political funds.” 
From this context in which a separate ‘rules of the game’ prevails, multiple issues arise which are 
difficult to monitor, track and reduce due to the lack of transparency and regulatory processes. 
Issues arising from this current trade regime can be highlighted by the amount of unrecorded 
informal trade across Nigeria’s borders that are a result of the procedures in place by Nigerian 
authorities for clearing customs that are complex and cumbersome. It is also difficult for traders 
to register products under the ETLS and to make international trade payments through formal 
                                                   
39 https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf 
40 https://etradeforall.org/ratification-of-african-continental-free-trade-area-gets-underway/ 
41 http://www.etls.ecowas.int/ 
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channels. These factors provide strong incentives to use informal trade routes, which contribute 
to significant volumes of unrecorded informal trade across Nigeria’s borders42.  
 
Nigeria – the AfCFTA, Institutional Challenges and Opportunities   
Nigeria’s engagement with the AfCFTA has been strongly influenced by informal linkages 
between powerful actors and the political class. It is thought that these informal processes will 
continue to play a role in implementation of what is the formal process associated with the 
Agreement (ECDPM 2019). Moreover, a legacy of institutional and policy inconsistency is making 
it difficult for the Nigerian private sector to trust that government will effectively undertake the 
reforms needed [under AfCFTA] to improve the business environment in Nigeria43. This is 
marked by the perceived failings of key institutions that have been established to build a more 
coherent approach to trade policy negotiations i.e. the AfCFTA Commission and the Nigerian 
Office of Trade Negotiations (NOTN). Consumer groups, such as the Consumer Advocacy 
Foundation of Nigeria, have also largely been neglected in trade policy discourse in Nigeria 
where traditionally such groups have been less well organised than producers and 
manufacturers. As a result, policies have tended to favour producers’ interests (e.g. domestic 
protection), and not consumers’ interests (e.g. lower prices) (ECDPM 2019).  
However, AfCFTA negotiations seem to have inspired new domestic initiatives and possibilities 
which may help implementation44. For example, The Nigerian services sector which had not 
provided much input to trade policymaking processes or trade negotiations, launched the 
Nigerian Coalition of Services Industries in July 2018 to function as a lobby group on trade in 
services. Likewise, the financial services sector sees opportunities in e-commerce partnerships 
in Nigeria45 which is linking into the optimism held within the African Union that e-commerce 
could help the AfCFTA to deliver on its aim of significantly boosting inter-regional trade46. Nigeria 
is ranked the 7th highest internet using country in the world where online commerce and financial 
technology in Nigeria is being strengthened by fast growing youth populations, expanding 
consumer power, and increased smartphone penetration4748.  The challenge for Nigeria however 
will be for its new trade institutions (e.g. NOTN) to mobilise sufficiently around the AfCFTA, even 
                                                   
42 Includes: Fasan (2015); Hoffman and Melly, (2015); Woolfrey, Philomena Apiko and Kesa Pharatlhatlhe, 
(2019); Byiers et al (2018); Medinilla (2018); Hulse (2016) 
43 ECDPM Discussion Paper No 242 Woolfrey et al (2019)  
44 Ibid 43 
45 Ibid 43 
46 https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13988 
47 https://www.export.gov/article?id=Nigeria-E-Commerce 
48 The current e-commerce spending in Nigeria is estimated at $12 billion and is projected to reach $75 billion in 
revenues per annum by 2025 (source US Government: Ibid 47). 
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before the Government ratifies the Agreement, in order to harness not just the potential of the 
digital economy but also to draw in the vast informal cross border trade sector49,50.   
 
4. Impactful institutions in trade: listing those with 
significant potential 
This review considers the role of the following institutions and the potential, with additional 
assistance, for enhancing impact on inclusive growth in trade and where therefore this provides 
an indication of entry points for external technical assist. 
1. Ministries of Trade, Economy and Industry 
With Ministries of Trade and Economy typically being given the responsibility for managing the 
implementation of trade facilitation reforms in developing countries, the challenge is for the 
Ministry to be able to work authoritatively as well as collaboratively across government and with 
the private sector to manage and achieve optimal buy-in for the change management process. 
However, progress has often been frustrated despite the presence of high-level political will in 
circumstances where there is no previous culture of ministerial cooperation.  
Moreover, efforts by Ministries of Trade to drive trade reforms are further complicated through 
the activities of subordinate regulatory and enforcement agencies e.g. customs, national 
standards, sanitary and phyto-sanitary bodies, in which it has already been well documented that 
countries struggle to overcome the reticence to collaborate or coordinate their activities (silo 
working). This is a situation sometimes exacerbated by the need to compete for resources and 
even the rent seeking opportunities that arise in the process of moving goods across borders. 
However, adoption of comprehensive and coherent trade strategies has shown the potential to 
produce results.  
Waage, Yap et al (2015), see the matter of institutional governance and breaking down silo 
working as essential in terms of reaching acceptance of responsibility, transparency, 
accountability, capacity, and legitimacy at sub-national, national, and international levels to 
achieve progress in the context of the SDGs. The suggestion is that governments should devise 
formal governance mechanisms at the national and sub-national levels that are characterised by 
deliberation, participation, and transparency in decision-making.  
This requires engaging community organisations who are already mobilised around these issues 
and inviting democratic debate around middle-level goals and particularly conflicts. 
Responsibilities should be defined, accountability systems put in place, and human capacities 
built accordingly51. In summary, these considerations should be factored into the planning cycle 
                                                   
49 Ibid 43 (16) 
50 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20151207NigeriaBoomingBordersKoniHof
fmannMellyExecSum.pdf  
51 Ibid 2 
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of national trade facilitation roadmaps that are forming part of development partner focus in the 
provision of technical assistance in developing countries (e.g. Under the UNCTAD National 
Trade Facilitation Empowerment programme).  
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) of Rwanda through its National Export Strategy 
(NEC) lays claim to have made substantial impact through its trade strategy. Achievements 
include having reduced the impact of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade through the elimination of 
21 NTBs between July 2014 and March 2015. The measures taken included the elimination of 
multiple customs declarations and inspections; harmonisation of national park fees and an end to 
the weighing of empty trucks on the Northern corridor.  The increased automation of the trade 
processes also reduced the average number of days taken to transport goods from 21 to less 
than six and from 17 to less than five along the Northern and Central Corridors, respectively. This 
has been linked to a reduction of trade costs of up to 25% since 201052.   
In the case of Sudan, the Ministry of Trade has played in key role in the process of trade 
facilitation reforms instigated by the Government as far back as 2007. With the establishment of 
the Trade Facilitation working Group, the Ministry of Trade has taken on the lead role for 
ensuring the implementation of a multi-year strategic roadmap covering the years 2017-2021. 
The key feature of this comprehensive trade facilitation roadmap is that it sets out a clear vision 
as well as baselines Sudan’s present position for example on time taken to clear goods and 
thereafter sets out specific goals and activities which are accountable to named Ministries and 
agencies and which are measurable against key performance indicators (where many of the 
objectives are the responsibility the Ministry of Trade. 
The Sudan Trade Facilitation Roadmap was drawn up with support and technical assistance 
from the tripartite arrangement between UNCTAD, The World Customs Organisation (WCO) and 
UK HMRC.  Crucially, the capacity building support provided to Ministry Staff and those working 
in the subordinate National Trade Facilitation Committee in support of the roadmap 
implementation process included an extensive and coordinated upskilling programme.    
Sudan is credited as the first country in the world to have completed the UNCTAD sponsored 
professional and comprehensive training under the National Trade Facilitation Committee 
Empowerment Programme which covered sensitisation to international standards and 
recommendations for trade facilitation, measuring trade facilitation impact and facilitating national 
ownership in drawing up the trade facilitation Implementation Roadmap53.  
However, despite the level of ambition given over to this flagship effort, the impact and long-term 
success of this initiative remains uncertain as indicated in the latest World Bank Trading Across 
Borders performance index, which shows Sudan remaining well below the regional average54. 
The capacity for the Ministry of Trade to maintain momentum for achieving the goals set out in 
the trade facilitation Roadmap and in the face of challenges coming in the form of recent political 
upheavals and in the event of changes in personnel, will provide a litmus test to the viability (in 
                                                   
52 http://www.minicom.gov.rw/fileadmin/minicom_publications/Planning_documents/Annual_Report_2015-
2016.pdf page 10 
53 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtl_ttf_2016_TFRoadMap_Sudan_en.pdf 
54 http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sudan/SDN.pdf page 40  
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terms of impact and effectiveness of NTFCs).  This should therefore be the subject of on-going 
monitoring by DFID.    
 
Case Study: Building Collaboration across Ministries and Agency Institutions – 
Zambia. Adopting a multi-agency approach and creating partnerships between 
Government agencies and the private sector is embedded into the narrative on trade 
facilitation. However, for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Landlocked Least 
Developed Countries, border agency collaboration (Article 8 of the TFA) is in the top 3 of 
the notified measures under the TFA requiring external technical assistance (behind 
Single Window and Authorised Operators). This recognises the scale of the challenge in 
creating a joined-up policy on border control and customs clearance, which in turn 
represent processes that are highly interlinked and interdependent. In the African context, 
Zambia provides one example of how this need is being addressed through the 
Government’s recent enactment of ‘The Coordinated Border Management and Trade 
Facilitation Bill’ in 2018 which also legislated for the establishment of the National Trade 
Facilitation Committee (NCTF) and operationalisation of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP) 
with neighbouring partner states55. However, despite having taken this significant 
legislative step towards securing cross-ministerial and agency coordination in trade 
facilitation reforms, the Government of Zambia has still indicated that it will require 
internal capacity building to enable it to implement Border Agency Cooperation as set out 
in Article 8 of the WTO TFA. In relation to achieving impact therefore, the questions this 
raises is firstly; what steps the Government of Zambia will take to translate this primary 
legislation into more detailed implementing provisions (secondary legislation) and 
standard operating procedures; secondly, what steps is it taking to sensitise (including 
training) of its enforcement/regulatory agency staff to accommodate new collaborative 
practices and arrangement as prescribed under the law and thirdly, what will be the 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms to ensure conformity and consistent application 
across government agencies?     
 
2. Joint Public / Private Sector Consultative Committees (e.g. 
National Trade Facilitation Committees) 
The establishment of National Trade Facilitation Committees (NTFC) is one of the few mandatory 
provisions under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (Article 23.2). NTFCs typically, but not 
exclusively, fall under the governance and remit of the Ministry of Trade and Economy (83% in 
the case of Africa according to an UNCTAD survey)56. This makes this institution of key 
importance in translating more liberal trade regimes into effective procedures that work across 
ministries, government agencies and private sector stakeholders. The opportunity should exist 
therefore for such bodies to become champions in the development and implementation of 
                                                   
55 http://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/7745 
56 https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/1.%20UNCTAD%20Study%20on%20NTFC_P.%20Hansen.pdf 
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effective trade policy that can mainstream gender57, MSMEs, entrepreneurship and for bridging 
the digital divide.  
Even at such an early stage in their institutional evolution, these bodies are showing promise as 
a conduit through which development partners/donors are already concentrating investment in. 
These initiatives are not only designed to support developing countries in ensuring NTFCs can 
function as intended i.e. a vehicle to fulfil the implementation of the TFA as a collaborative 
partnership enterprise between the public and private sector, but also as a body that can oversee 
discreet and inclusive trade facilitation initiatives (ITC). However, the level of development 
partner investment needs to be viewed in the context of a growing list of capacity building needs, 
which developing countries have reported to the WTO58.  
The UK Government through the Commonwealth Heads of Government is a principle funder of 
UNCTAD’s NTFC Empowerment Programme (one of the organisation’s flagship TFA initiatives). 
At this stage, 22 NTFCs have received support with a further 6 being due to receive capacity 
building during 2019. This support ranges from developing Trade Facilitation Roadmaps to 
capacity building workshops and online training courses on NTFC operationalisation for 
managerial and technical level staff. However, UNCTAD cite lack of funding as being a limiting 
factor in meeting demand at this time59.  
Whilst NTFC’s have been established as functional bodies on paper in developing countries, in 
reality many face multiple challenges and are ill-prepared to serve the purpose of driving through 
the ambitious change in cross-border trade practices60 (see figure 1 below). At this time however, 
no comprehensive independent evaluation has taken place which details the different 
governance and operation arrangements applied across national NTFCs which can determine 
their functional capacity and effectiveness (with the data that is available largely having been 
gleaned from the respondent country institution through international scoping surveys61).  
However, more useful insights on NTFC country best practice in governance and operation are 
likely to become available in the near future through UNCTAD’s ‘Compendium Project’ linked to 
DC/LDCs capacity building and attainment of the TFA and SDG Target 17.962. 
                                                   
57 https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/cimem7p20_Mariangela%20Linoci_en.pdf 
58 At the time of writing this report, there are around 790 individual technical areas of the TFA requiring external 
assistance (Category C commitments). The WTO is in the process of matching beneficiaries to donors to support 
implementation https://www.tfadatabase.org/members (source WTO TFA Facility Database 
https://www.tfadatabase.org/members).  
59 Based on comments made to the IMC report author by senior UNCAT experts at the 7th Multi-Year Experts 
Meeting in Geneva 7th-9th May 2019  
60 https://unctad.org/en/Pages/MeetingDetails.aspx?meetingid=1886 
61 For example, see 
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/1.%20UNCTAD%20Study%20on%20NTFC_P.%20Hansen.pdf 
62 SDG 17, Target 17.9: Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building 
in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including 
through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation   
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49% Lack of funding / resources  
28% Maintain engagement / motivation of 
participants and absenteeism 
19% Incorrect representation of members / 
frequent replacement of members  
19% Lack of coordination / conflicts of interest 
13% Lack of political will  
Apostolov, (UNECE, 2017) links the need to overcome different mandates and vested interests in 
the national political economy to the establishment of NTFCs in line with UN/CEFACT 
Recommendation 4. However, where NTFCs in developing countries are generally at an early 
stage in their operation, the potential for impact remains yet to be tested. However, through 
referencing ITC’s collaboration with the Governments off Zambia and Morocco, it is possible to 
begin to gauge the potential of these bodies to have a significant and long-term impact on 
inclusive trade strategy where it has the capacity to take ownership of the management of 
discreet programmes of sensitisation and capacity building. The following examples are 
initiatives where ITC is linking in private sector capacity building through NTFCs.   
Initiative 1: Zambia. The NTFC has embarked on a programme of support and upskilling 
of its cadre of customs clearing agents to reduce mistakes in the customs clearance 
process and the consequent delays and unnecessary physical inspections of goods at 
the border. The programme will introduce a new framework for licensing customs 
clearing agents, which will include a training course with an exam to demonstrate 
competence as part of professionalising the sector and for growing trust between 
customs and traders. This training initiative is being designed to maximise accessibility 
for all, particularly for women who, as primary caregivers, face additional time 
constraints. A scholarship fund will be set up to help customs clearing agents with any 
additional costs such as training and exam fees, materials, travel and accommodation63. 
Initiative 2: Morocco. In respect of its important agri-food sector, the country is also 
receiving support from ITC through the launch of a programme to introduce electronic 
phytosanitary certificates (ePhytos) which can be shared with other countries as part of 
an initiative led by the International Plant Protection Convention. To implement and 
                                                   
63 https://www.tradefacilitation.org/content/uploads/2019/03/global-alliance-for-trade-facilitation-annual-report-
2018.pdf 
Figure 1 percentage of national trade facilitation committees that mention common challenges (Source 
UNCTAD, 2017: 57) 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb2017d3_en.pdf  
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oversee the project, a steering committee is to be established that will sit under 
Morocco’s National Trade Facilitation Committee, ensuring the project remains 
connected to Morocco’s wider trade facilitation agenda64. 
The Kenya NTFC organisational model demonstrates the extent to which a national body of this 
kind can be, on the face of it, widely collaborative and inclusive with around 59 government 
ministries, subordinate agencies, industry and logistics representative bodies making up the 
stakeholder environment65.  Whilst this may be an impressive list, what is not clear however is 
the extent to which the NTFC’s Secretariat is effective in managing its stakeholders to ensure 
their voice gets heard in the strategic planning process on trade facilitation implementation.  To 
the extent that capacity is an existential issue for the Kenya NTFC, it is noted that the State 
Department of Trade of Kenya has agreed with TMEA over a further programme of technical 
assistance due to commence in 201966     
There is evidence too of NTFCs collaborating with Advocacy organisations, which it is suggested 
adds an element of credibility and oversight in terms of identifying and reporting of trade 
bottlenecks and process inefficiencies and attempting to resolve them through the consultative 
process of the NTFC. For example, the Borderless Alliance is a multilateral partnership of private 
and public sector stakeholders, which covers the West African region and is funded in part 
through USAID and GiZ67. Where the Alliance is reported to have played a role in enabling 
NTFCs in the ECOWAS68 region69,  
3. Customs and Border Agencies 
Customs and other border agencies play a pivotal role in the enforcement of national laws 
concerning the control international trade. In this regard, the way in which these agencies are 
governed and operate has a significant impact on a country’s trade performance outlook as well 
as attractiveness for foreign direct investments and participation and in unlocking local trade and 
entrepreneur potential to participate in global value chains and e-Commerce opportunities.    
The international development community has a long tradition of investing in building institutional 
capacity in border agencies as a means of realising economic growth potential and in reducing 
poverty through the introduction of more effective i.e. simpler and more transparent, processes 
                                                   
64 Ibid 1 
65 http://www.trade.go.ke/sites/default/files/NTF%20Committee%20and%20Its%20Thematic%20WGs_0.pdf page 
13-14 
66 Tender Title: Consultancy Services to Support the State Department for Trade to Implement WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement PRQ20180168 
67 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
68 Economic Community of West African States  
69 http://www.borderlesswa.com/sites/default/files/resources/aug18/2017%20Borderless%20Alliance-
%20Annual%20Report-%20Eng.pdf 
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and procedures for dealing with customs clearance70.  However, as is often the case at the 
Ministerial level, then the situation of lack of capacity, funding and silo working amongst customs 
and other border agencies has also been a prevalent feature within the political economy of 
developing countries. The lack of a joined-up approach and sometimes institutional mistrust has 
been an inhibitor to the adoption of more effective, risk and audit-based, control of cross border 
trade71. This has contributed to the traditionally high cost of doing business in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa Region. 
Until recently, much of the focus of external capacity building by donors has been around 
supporting national customs administrations. In contrast, less attention has been paid to 
addressing the organisational efficiency of other border agencies who play a key role in the 
regulation and enforcement of non-tariff measures, such as the issue and control of phyto-
sanitary licences pertaining to the health and safety of imported and exported agricultural 
products72 (a significant feature of trade in Africa73).   
However, through the development of landmark international agreements such as the WTO TFA, 
member states’ governments have recognised and accepted that border management should be 
viewed holistically as part of a collaborative border management concept74. This considers the 
fact that the efficiency of a nation’s trade and border management arrangements e.g. measuring 
the time taken to clear goods, may be assessed by the performance of its least efficient as 
opposed to its best performing agency. A border agency that is capable of translating 
international, regional and international trade policy into capacity to prevent cross border fraud as 
well as being a facilitator and partner to legitimate traders, will depend on many factors not least: 
political will; leadership and; a ‘goals’ oriented organisational strategy linked to a country’s cross-
government national trade policy (e.g. Kenya)75.  
Since the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement came into force in February 2017, many least 
developed countries have reported their requirements for external capacity building in support of 
implementation of the Agreement. Likewise, the international development community is 
responding with a series of flagship capacity building programmes which are aimed a closing the 
capacity gaps between border agency partners. These include: 
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http://worldcustomsjournal.org/Archives/Volume%2010%2C%20Number%201%20%28Mar%202016%29/1796%
2001%20WCJ%20v10n1%20Heinesson.pdf 
71 https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N1PG.pdf page v 
72 https://www.tfafacility.org/sites/default/files/case-
studies/usaid_a_comprehensive_approach_to_trade_facilitation_and_capacity_building_june_2015.pdf (page 9) 
73 See for example https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/turning-point-agricultural-exports-sub-saharan-africa 
74 Coordinated Border Management (CBM) linked to Article 8 of the TFA is recognised as being key to unlocking 
many of the traditional trade facilitation challenges. However, insofar as this is a matter of promoting better 
cooperation amongst border agencies (including those in partner countries), also important is where 
Governments act decisively to improve collaboration between border agencies and the private sector where this 
can further benefit the cost and efficiency of moving goods across borders (e.g. Zambia passing the Coordinated 
Border Management and Trade Facilitation Bill in 2018).  
75 http://www.trade.go.ke/sites/default/files/Kenya%20National%20Trade%20Policy%20%282016%29_0.pdf 
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 The World Bank Trade Facilitation Support Programme (TFSP); 
 The WCO-HMRC-UNCTAD Mercator Programme; 
 The Commonwealth Trade Facilitation Support Programme76  (supporting the UNCTAD 
NTFC Empowerment Programme; 
 DFID support for the TFA through SITFA; 
 IMF AFRITAC/CARTAC programmes; 
 Various EU TF related initiatives77   
The following case studies draw out some of the key challenges faced by border agency 
institutions in terms of managing and in being accountable for the transition required under the 
TFA and the other international and regional influencers already described.    
Case 1: Project Management Capacity and Delegated Authority with a Customs Authority 
(ECOWAS Member State Revenue Authority) 
Fulfilling the commitments called for under the TFA, AfCTFA, national development 
programmes and organisational strategic plans will require senior managers in border 
agencies (not just customs) to have the right skills to be able to deliver the transition to new 
working practices effectively as well as collaboratively under a coordinated cross-government 
approach. Highlighting this is a finding from a DFID study from January/February 2018 
(undertaken by the author) of the Revenue Authority (RA) of an ECOWAS member State 
which centred on the identification of two key constraints to the implementation of an IMF 
backed multi-year strategic plan to implement the provisions of the TFA.  
Firstly, was that the RA had established a Modernisation Unit whose primary function was on 
leading reforms. However, the Unit at that time had extremely limited resources, essentially 
one middle level manager, whose project management experience and qualifications were 
insufficient to cope with the scale of reform demanded by such an ambitious programme.  
The second issue was that the RA did not encourage, practice or otherwise have in place a 
formal mechanism that allowed senior managers to delegate authority where appropriate to 
junior managers. Consequently, the speed and efficiency with which change management 
was possible in the organisation was severely restricted.  
This situation contrasts with other national institutions such as the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) which, through the introduction of the formal Delegation of Authority (DOA) 
procedures, managers are empowered to take key decisions so that they can respond quickly and 
effectively to changing business needs. These procedures ensure that good governance is upheld 
when authority is delegated from executives to managers78. 
 
Case 2: Lack of Secondary Legislation/Implementing Provisions (ECOWAS member state 
Revenue Authority) 
The RA, whilst ostensibly having in place institutional accountability mechanisms regarding the 
performance and conduct of officials, the matter of enforcement is complicated due to an 
absence of approved (i.e. signed-off at the executive level), secondary legislation (although these 
existed in draft form). Sometimes referred to as implementing provisions, such a legal instrument 
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is necessary to support overarching primary legislation (for example for a Customs Code) where 
it provides a detailed and prescriptive interpretation of primary law for every aspect of customs 
agency’s business delivery. In the absence of such provisions, this provides a process ‘get out 
clause’ for incompetent or corrupt behaviour and lessens the possibility of holding managers and 
operational level staff in regulatory or enforcement agencies to account for the way they use 
(abuse) their powers79.  
   
Case 3: Institutional Succession Planning or Political Economy interference? (Zimbabwe) 
The Chirundu One Stop Border Post (OSBP) between Zimbabwe and Zambia opened to much 
international acclaim in 2009 as a means of facilitating cross border trade through this major 
transit road artery. This was achieved through the presence of political will and the building of 
new infrastructure and in implementing a highly collaborative environment involving the partner 
agencies in each jurisdiction. As a result of this initiative, the time traders had to wait at the 
border for customs clearance reduced from 120 hours in 2009 to 25 hours in 2012. Similarly, 
commercial passenger vehicles had waiting times halved from two to one hour under previous 
arrangements.  
It is estimated that the new measures translated into cost savings for the transport sector of 
around US$600,000 a day while increasing the volume of traffic through the border post by 65% 
percent. However, one reports suggests that these early gains could not be sustained where 
border agency staff who had previously received extensive training in the new collaborative 
customs clearance arrangements, were either rotated to new posts or otherwise left the agencies 
to be replaced by new staff who (by accident of by design) reverted to previous to previous 
inefficient procedures. The report points to the lack of monitoring and oversight by the 
Government and its agencies contributed to this situation80.  
Assuming that the situation at the Chirundu OSBP was caused by institutional weaknesses in 
border agency training and succession planning as opposed to the government of the time 
deliberately acting to erode the gains of one of its flagship regional policy initiatives, then this 
Reviews contends that this presents a very real risk of back-sliding in any and all trade facilitation 
focused technical assistance. The Chirundu OSBP case again highlights the need to strengthen 
oversight and audit capacity to mitigate this risk.  
Beyond this example and highlighting how OSBPs are generally viewed as being key to the 
growth of regional trade and transport efficiency. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) in partnership 
with the East Africa Community Secretariat and its Partner States and lead agencies have 
embarked on a programme to establish and operationalise 13 One Stop Border Posts and the 
implementation of Integrated Border Management Systems81. In terms of assessing the impact of 
these highly collaborative border arrangements, TMEA survey data suggests that since the 
operationalisation of the ‘Mutukula’ OSBP early in 2017, the time to cross from Uganda to 
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Tanzania has reduced by 66% from 10 hours in 2011 to 3.4 hours 27 minutes in June 2017. 
Similarly, crossing from Tanzania to Uganda reduced from 46 hours to 4.5 in June 201782. 
4. Customs broker 
Customs brokers act as intermediaries between traders and other parties involved in moving 
goods internationally and as such play a pivotal role in trade efficiency thanks to their in-depth 
knowledge of the import export environment, customs laws, tariffs and regulations. In certain 
economies, brokers are the only channel through which, by law, producers can sell their goods 
internationally83.  
In view of the role performed by Customs Brokers, the communication and training provided to 
them on new trade processes, as well as on IT developments (e.g. the introduction of electronic 
single window systems) are viewed as being critical in the process of implementing new trade 
strategies. According to the World Bank Doing Business report 2019, the use of regular training 
to promote the development of the specific skills or knowledge to customs clearance officials and 
customs brokers reduces the number of process errors and is positively associated with 
increased trade volumes as well as lower border and documentary compliance times.   
In the case of Cameroon, in line with many countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa Region, the issue 
of cross border trade efficiency has been negatively impacted due to the large number of 
informal brokers who operate without a licence and therefore illegally at border crossings. A key 
factor is the lack of competence and professionalism of customs brokers as well as small 
importers, who often do not exercise due diligence in the clearance process. This results in 
considerable delays in payment and slows down the entire logistics chain. The capacity and 
professionalism of the private sector have a large effect on the clearing process. For instance, an 
analysis of Douala port by a major freight forwarder found that delays caused by customs 
procedures were significantly less than could be attributed to the lack of, or erroneous, customs 
documentation presented by the importer84.  
However, in Cameroon, brokers are viewed as being politically powerful and certain past 
initiatives by the national Trade Facilitation Committee (GUCE) to address the risk have been 
unsuccessful. For example, an attempt was made by customs to establish a certification 
programme for brokers and freight forwarders but ultimately this failed ostensibly due to the level 
of influence this group was able to exert85. Accepting that a well-functioning border relies heavily 
on the knowledge, professionalism and integrity of customs brokers, the Zambia example 
(mentioned in section 2, NTFCs) provides another example of where the lack of a proper 
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licensing framework and accreditation programme for customs clearing agents risks cross border 
trade efficiency.   
5. Transport and Logistic Bodies 
Trade and Transport costs in East Africa are amongst the highest in the world according to the 
Doing Business and the Logistics Performance Indicator report series of the World Bank. These 
are largely attributed to bureaucracies in documentation of trade in goods, uncoordinated goods 
inspection processes by border agencies as well as the multiple steps involved in the clearance 
of goods across borders. These impede the region’s ability to trade competitively in the 
international market. In particular, the time taken to get to and from the ports to land locked 
countries is a major factor.86 
As one of the key foundations for manufacturing, trade and growth, logistics is a strategic 
component of every economy. A competent logistics sector is vital for well-functioning trade flows 
and taking advantage of global value chains thereby contributing to a stronger economy and 
better jobs. However, there is said to be little systematic evidence of a link between the size of 
the logistics sector and economic outcomes, such as trade openness (World Bank - Shepherd 
2011). However, according to the African Development Bank (year), if all countries could bring 
border administration, together with transport and communications infrastructure, up to just half 
the level of global best practice, global GDP would grow by $2.6 trillion (4.7 percent), and total 
exports would increase by $1.6 trillion (14.5 percent)87. 
In 2016 and 2018, the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index found that many developing 
countries face a significant skills gap in the logistics sector, especially at the managerial level. In 
addition, protectionism, union control, fair market access competition and the condition of local 
logistics fleets all contribute to making logistics inefficient and expensive (although the influence 
and importance of the transport and transit sectors vary in weight across countries with different 
implications for reform)88. 
In principle governments, transporters, shippers and port operators all seek to improve efficiency 
to allow more transport although in practice governments often have limited resources to improve 
matters89 and many different parties benefit from current inefficient practices. In addition, a 
UNCTAD survey of NTFCs found that only 13% of respondents cited transport facilitation issues 
as being within their remit90.  A study of Transit and Transport arrangements in West Africa 
(Saana Consulting) found that the interests of shippers, consumers, producers and traders, are 
largely absent in discussions around regional transport, with only a few cases emerging of 
coalitions of reform among citizens, firms or logistics hubs like ports. In contrast, professional 
associations and coalitions of public and professional stakeholders in the port of Abidjan seem to 
                                                   
86 http://web.monitor.co.ug/Supplement/2018/trademark-Busia16032018.pdf 
87Ibid 1 page xxi  
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find common ground to cooperate around particular areas of problem solving and reforms, 
especially given the high economic stakes around the metropolitan transport market of Abidjan91.  
Some regional initiatives, such as ASEAN, have recognised the importance of logistics by 
treating it as an independent “cluster” for negotiation and liberalisation purposes92. This suggests 
a potential entry point for development partners to facilitate coalitions through greater inclusion 
of the transport industry within the trade facilitation reform agenda. This fits in with the view of 
McLinden and others (World Bank, 201193) that (developing) countries should put in place trust 
building mechanisms, partnerships, and cooperative initiatives that bring together the many 
participants in the transit and corridor operations of which transport efficiency is a vital element. 
The following case studies indicate the way in which increased inclusivity and partnerships could 
be achieved through investments in more coherent and efficient cross-border transport inter-
connectivity. 
 
Case Study 1 - TMEA initiatives to improve regional effectiveness in logistics  
(LIFT - Logistics Innovation for Trade). TMEA aims to reduce transport time along the 
main East Africa transport corridors by 15% by 2016. To achieve this, TMEA has adopted 
a mixed approach including infrastructure and software development support that will 
reduce or eliminate bottlenecks along the corridors. TMEA established the LIFT 
Challenge fund, targeting innovators in the private and public sector to develop and test 
new ideas that could reduce the cost and time of transport and logistics in the East Africa 
region. LIFT is a competitive financing facility that co-invests with successful innovators 
in projects that have the potential to offer logistics solutions, but that may be too risky to 
undertake94. 
TMEA has also provided funding and technical assistance for the private sector players, 
through the Private Sector Foundation Uganda, in the creation of a National Logistics 
Platform to support the logistics industry in Uganda and to increase collaboration and 
engagement with the Government of Uganda (in collaboration with the Ministry of Works 
and Transport) on logistics policies, such as local content, to ensure that the industry 
benefits from the upcoming Oil and Gas industry95. 
However, there is little data to support the level of impact of both these initiatives. This 
Review therefore suggests that an NTFC would have a role in monitoring and evaluation 
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to ensure capture of information on improved efficiency and reduced costs in the 
transport and logistics sector in order to factor in as part of a coherent TF and transport 
strategy.   
Case Study 2 – Trade and Transport Corridor Monitoring Mechanisms.  
Provided here are examples of how private sector advocacy is strengthening oversight 
within the transit/transport sector in-line with UN/CEFACT Recommendation 4296.    
 Established in September 2011, the USAID funded Borderless Alliance (BA) represents 
a private sector-led coalition to increase trade in West Africa and foster change by 
exposing trade inefficiencies throughout the region. To address the issues of 
sustainability and effectiveness, BA has evolved from an advocacy campaign into the 
region’s leading advocacy platform. From an initial group of six, BA now enjoys more 
than 50 dues-paying members from the private sector, across West Africa. Its 
membership base draws from a broad range of organizations involved in the various 
supply chains including port authorities, freight forwarders, logistics operators, 
manufacturers, traders and farmers. The BA’s premise is that by working together, 
businesses and traders can advocate effectively for change. 
In East Africa, similar monitoring centres established in Rwanda to Tanzania are said to 
have reduced transit time by 70%97. However, highlighting the challenges of successfully 
coordinating and agreeing transport and trade facilitation linked initiatives at the RECs 
and national level, can be seen from the role of the EAC Electronic Cargo Tracking 
System (ECTS). The ECTS is aimed not only at facilitating transit cargoes but also 
enhancing security and safety. However, Tanzania and Burundi have yet to adopt the 
system (Tanzania is currently using its own technology). 98 
 
6. Private Sector Industry Representative Bodies and Informal 
Trade Initiatives 
The needs and interests of private sector actors are often poorly articulated and presented at 
regional levels, and therefore difficult to address. Consequently, private sector forces tend to 
ignore regional policies or seek to block implementation. Examples include resistance to the 
ETLS and CET schemes in Nigeria, where operators seek waivers and other protective 
measures against cheap extra-regional imports.  
This section provides examples of how trade facilitation related initiatives are increasing the 
inclusivity of the private sector including minority groupings through offering gateways to market 
access opportunities. Other examples demonstrate the potential of the public private sector 
consultative process to provide additional monitoring and advocacy of trade reforms. Reiterating 
a key contention of this Study is the role that NTFCs can play in taking a lead in driving the 
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initiatives mentioned below, or at the very least to engage with them at a meaningful level, as 
part of an overarching national trade facilitation strategy.   
Trade openness and the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have 
increased women’s access to economic opportunities and in some cases increased their wages 
relative to men’s99. Growth in export and ICT-enabled sectors, together with a decline in the 
importance of physical strength and a rise in the importance of cognitive skills, has increased the 
demand for female labour. ICT has also increased access to markets among female farmers and 
entrepreneurs by easing time and mobility constraints100. However, Zahanogo (2016), suggests 
that developing countries lacking in human capital skills, R&D and a well-functioning financial 
system, may not take full advantage of technology transfer.   
This considers the trend towards more services being made available through online platforms 
e.g. e-phyto sanitary certificates and electronic trade information portals and electronic Single 
Window and linked to on-going international initiatives such as UNCTAD’s ‘eTrade for All’, 
eTrade for Woman Network and the World Bank eTrade for Development101.  
However, implementing new automated trade systems such as the national electronic single 
window is inherently complex not least that it requires a high level of human capacity, funding, an 
enabling legal environment and the need for ministries and agencies to agree to cooperate and 
to share data. Introducing automation also signals a transition away from the traditional face-to-
face dealing between officials and traders that allowed rent seeking behaviours to flourish. 
Therefore, where this transaction can be managed effectively at the national level, this may be 
taken as a key barometer that the political economy has shifted towards reform.    
Case Study 1.  ITC SheTrade & SheTrade in the Commonwealth  
As a contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals, the International Trade Centre 
has launched the SheTrades initiative to create an ecosystem of integrated solutions that 
empower women economically through trade. Through country-based activities, 
SheTrades enables women entrepreneurs to improve the quality of their products and 
services. There have been more than 10 SheTrades country launches where 
governments have embraced the initiative and adapted it to local context to ensure that 
women have a greater role in their economies. More than 120 corporations and 
institutions have signed up to support the initiative. 
Robinson and Friedman (2007) describe the UMA (Uganda Manufacturers Association) 
as one of the most effective policy impacts Civil Society Organisations in Uganda 
(although this review would argue that the body is more akin to an industry representative 
body rather than a CSO per se). As well as working closely with a range of Government 
Ministries and Agencies, the UMA maintains links with a list of development partners 
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including: World Bank (WB), United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO); Royal Danish Embassy Uganda; USAID; GIZ; and the European Union (EU).    
UMA has a track record of active advocacy with the Government of Uganda on trade 
related issues for example lobbying with the Minister of Trade Industry and Cooperatives 
in the suspension of the Pre-Shipment Verification on Conformity to Standards (PIVoC) 
which was proving a burden to local importers  in terms of the challenges Ugandan 
businesses faced in securing the Certificate of Conformity from the Manufacturers in the 
country of origin102. 
The UMA also engages in consultative meetings. The outcomes of these meetings have 
seen several members exempted from payment of import duty through stay of application 
of Common External Tariff (CET) on certain raw materials and intermediate products.  In 
addition, products which we have a competitive advantage have been protected though 
an increment in the CET. UMA continues to have consultative meetings with all the major 
sectors to understand their issues and challenges with the view to develop stronger 
policy positions to be submitted to Government103. 
In terms of trying to gauge UMA’s achievements in the context of the local political 
economy, it is noted that in all key respects Uganda shows lower international 
performance scorings compared to its neighbour Rwanda i.e. in terms of governance and 
corruption. As such what desk based research is not able to determine (over and above 
what PEA would be able to) is whether UMA’s advocacy with the Government in terms of 
trade reform is a product of a truly progressive attitude to reform and collaboration 
between the private and public sector or a product of the exercise of the power of narrow 
self-interest to maintain duty exemptions (another common feature of opaque and 
collusive practice leading to revenue leakage in many economies in Sub-Saharan Africa).   
 
Case Study 2. The Safe Trade Development Facility  
The Safe Trade Development Facility is supported by donors with a mandate to build 
sanitary and phyto sanitary capacity gaps (SPS) in developing countries in order to boost 
exports of agricultural produce. The facilitating safe trade imitative offers grants for 
initiatives to promote safe trade across borders. The facility aims to encourage dialogue 
on experiences, lessons and good practices to improve the implementation of SPS, 
making this aspect a good entry point for donors.  
Without these systems in place, there are often negative impacts on inclusive trade. 
There has been a reported issue that when there is a lack of certainty in the issuing and 
acceptance of SPS certificates, this creates a barrier to inclusive trade (STDF, 2018). A 
reported 43% of exporters from developing countries have cited the issuing and 
acceptance of certificates as a constraint for MSME’s to participate in e-commerce. 
(STFD, 2018). SPS e-Certs provide faster processing and clearance times, and lower 
travel costs. These SPS can drive more inclusive trade, especially for MSMEs. Female 
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traders, who face particular barriers in cross-border trade will likely be beneficiaries of 
this (STFD, 2018)104. 
 
7. Entrepreneurs 
By 2035, Africa will contribute more people to the workforce each year than the rest of the world 
combined. By 2050, the continent will be home to 1.25 billion people of working age. In order to 
absorb these new entrants, Africa needs to create more than 18 million new jobs each year. 
Across African markets, companies are pioneering business models that bridge the formal and 
informal sectors; in these models, each company is a formal entity, but can mobilise large 
numbers of informal actors in their supply chains or service delivery. While this has been done in 
dairies in Kenya and at coffee and cocoa out-growers across the continent and in other sectors 
for nearly a century, the penetration of mobile phones has enabled a new breed of African 
companies to monetise their ability to organise and inject trust into fragmented informal markets.  
Many of Africa’s new ‘gig economy’ firms are writing the rules for whole new industries in local 
markets and are being enabled to operate with greater agility through technology driven 
innovations such as M-PESA mobile payments system developed by Kenya’s largest telecoms 
operator (Safaricom). This system is said to have enabled millions of informal sector workers to 
move money at lower cost, which has provided a significant boost to the Kenyan and Tanzanian 
economies However, the gig economy comes with limitations. Lack of legal rights, limited career 
progression, stagnant pay and a lack of benefits as well as overcoming a dearth of funding 
remains one of the highest barriers for African entrepreneurs, and the development impact of 
investing in those that improve employment is enormous105.  
A study by ODI (2019) concludes that success in productive sector transformation only occurs 
when a mutual interest between indigenous entrepreneurs and politicians supports the formation 
of a pocket of effectiveness, where businesses get close support from a capable and specialised 
bureaucracy, enabling a sufficient level of productivity-oriented learning.  
This Study suggests therefore that NTFCs should be capable of fulfilling this function including 
developing strategies that can boost national entrepreneurship. This could be achieved not only 
through sensitisation of the trade facilitation policy roll-out but also in strengthening channels of 
opportunity for SMEs and to access trade finance for example, pre- export credit loans through 
programmes such as AfDB’s Trade Finance Programme (TFP).106  
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8. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are being sensitised, assisted by development partner 
interventions, to play the role as protagonist in trade advocacy (e.g. UNCTAD)107. However, there 
is little independent data as to which CSOs are translating this sensitisation into impact in the 
trade advocacy space in Africa. For example, the East African Civil Societies Organisation108 and 
the AGOA Civil Society Organisation109 appear to have been engaging with development 
partners and have made generalised commitments to link their respective strategies to the TFA, 
but beyond this, it is not clear how this is translating into tangible activities including formal 
collaboration with national Governments and RECs over TFA implementation and NTFCs.  
In contrast, the Government of Rwanda has been pro-active in bringing Civil Society within the 
national consultative process on trade through encouraging CSO inclusion into the workings of 
the National Trade Facilitation Committee110 (see below).  
Case Study: CSO empowerment in Rwanda111  
The Government of Rwanda considers civil society an important feature of good 
governance, as it provides an important framework for citizens to voice and aggregate 
their needs, offers a channel to convey them to government and is one of the key actors 
to hold public institutions accountable. 
The government of Rwanda, through the (Rwanda Governance Board RGB) has 
supported the establishment, growth and empowerment of Civil Society Organisations 
which now total over of 1,300 bodies. As part of this effort, specific laws were also 
enacted governing the organisation and functioning of national NGOs which simplified 
the registration of CSOs. The RGB was also instrumental in the establishment of the Civil 
Society Development Barometer (CSDB) as a research tool to assess the role and 
impact of CSOs in Rwanda’s prosperity.  
The results from this indicate that CSOs are generally regarded as effective in 
empowering people and advancing social interests although some need to be 
strengthened in holding state and corporates accountable and meeting social needs. It 
also highlighted the need for capacity development support to CSOs on a long-term basis 
with a view to bridging capacity disparities and ensuring that most CSOs play an active 
role in sustainable development programmes. 
It is against this background that RGB in partnership with One UN-Rwanda launched a 
five-year joint programme, with a total budget of US$8.6 million, aimed at strengthening 
CSOs for responsive and accountable governance in Rwanda. The Joint Action 
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Development Forum (JADF) is part of a wider strategy to deepen collaboration between 
CSOs and government to discuss and advocate for the voices of civil society to be taken 
into account in public policy making. The programme will also strengthen the capacities 
of CSOs to hold public and private sectors to account as well as advocate for the rights of 
the weak and marginalised sections of the Rwandan society. CSOs’ penetration into rural 
areas will be raised from 27% in 2012 to 50% in 2018.  
Strategic focus areas under the programme are: 
 Capacity development for CSOs: CSO networks have been selected through a 
competitive process and awarded grants. Prior to this, networks undertook capacity 
assessments of their members and developed capacity building plans; 
 Evidence-based policy advocacy: Financial resources provided to CSOs will 
enable them to undertake evidence-based policy advocacy through conducting policy 
research, developing policy models, conducting ad-hoc advocacy campaigns, holding 
policy dialogues to influence policymakers and evaluating the impact of policy 
advocacy; 
 Capacity strengthening of RGB: RGB will be enabled to put in place mechanisms 
for efficient registration of CSOs, including online registration and other ICT-based 
services, and also to implement its new strategic plan (for the CSO component) as 
well as the publication of a CSO directory on a bi-annual basis. Further, RGB intends 
to forge links with local academic institutions to provide short professional courses for 
CSOs. Additionally, RGB will convene annual policy dialogues on civil society and 
democratisation to discuss achievements and challenges in CSO development. 
The political economy of Rwanda is certainly not without challenges considering the question 
marks over the ability of its citizens to engage freely in political activity. However, the country’s  
model of CSO advocacy, as presented by its Government, has the potential to inform the 
evolving strategies of other EAC partner states and beyond. This considers the way in which 
inclusive public/private sector engagement, empowered under a legal framework, can serve to 
build shared ownership and accountability in this case, in the progress of trade reform.  
The contention is that the additional oversight this would bring would benefit on two fronts. 
Firstly, where a Rwanda style CSO empowerment law is put in place, the presence of such 
organisations in addition to other industry representative bodies, would help to increase 
accountability for government agencies charged with implementing new trade procedures. 
Secondly, it would provide an additional conduit of feedback on the progress of reform to entities 
who stand to benefit (i.e. promoting more inclusivity across business sectors and types). This 
approach aligns with current international development thinking which calls for developing 
interventions that use the prevalent, locally driven collective action practices as entry points for 
change and then seek to transform incentives incrementally (OECD 2015)112 
5. Opportunities to Engage 
The Review contests that international and regional trade agreements and development 
initiatives are having a significant influence on shaping the narrative and attitudes within the 
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national political economies of developing countries towards adopting a more reformist mindset 
in trade policy. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa this has been evidenced by countries 
committing to implement a range of new measures that will reduce friction at borders (the WTO 
TFA), and move African economies a step closer to creating a continent-wide customs and single 
market (through the AfCFTA). However, this process has not been marked by uniform levels of 
enthusiasm. Major regional economies such as Nigeria remain cautious over the potential impact 
that opening up its market to free trade will have on its own domestic market.  
With the majority of African states having now ratified the TFA this has resulted in a long list of 
capacity building and technical assistance requirements. which will require a coordinated 
response by the international development community as the Agreement moves into a long 
implementation phase. The scale of the list of capacity building needs is ambitious as it is 
daunting. This considers that countries are expected to manage (with or without external support) 
an almost seismic transition away from traditional disjointed and cumbersome cargo clearance 
processes (a cloak under which corruption has been able to thrive unabated) to highly 
automated, transparent and simplified systems of service delivery across all key national 
agencies, including customs. Arguably, the most seismic element of this transition is where these 
new processes are to be underpinned by high levels of collaboration between government 
agencies nationally and in neighbouring states but also between government agencies and the 
private sector in partnership and consultation. This is against a backdrop of ministries and 
agencies working in silos and an often, antagonistic relationship between the private sector and 
government agencies.   
For trade liberalisation reforms to succeed (as afforded by the implementation of the TFA and 
AfCFTA), this will almost certainly require trade-offs between the potential winners and losers 
from this transition. However, the extent to which this is playing out within the current political 
settlement in developing countries is not supported by extensive qualitative research. Where a 
country has adopted a strongly progressive and cohesive trade policy, this has produced tangible 
outcomes demonstrating that it is possible for national institutions to become more impactful and 
receptive to change. In the case of Rwanda, the actions undertaken by its Government, 
ministries and agencies has resulted in greater inclusivity and consultation with private sector 
institutions as well as having become a regional leader in the e-clearance services (factors which 
have contributed to the country’s impressive rise in the international performance indices). 
Achieving comparable gains through the implementation of the TFA and AfCFTA and other 
international and regional development initiatives will of course mean other countries in the 
region having to overcome multiple challenges not least in sustaining political will for reform but 
also considering budgetary, institutional capacity and infrastructure constraints. Moreover, this 
also recognises fundamental implementation challenges such as the absence of mechanisms for 
bottom up policy linkage between the operational and strategic levels within the organisation as 
well as weak policy designs, lack of monitoring and supervision mechanisms, ineffective 
administrative and managerial capacities113. 
However, a key contention of this study is that generally the vectors in national political 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are shifting towards a willingness to apply trade reforms 
related measures (where the long-term benefits of opening up national economies through trade 
                                                   
113 https://www.researchtoaction.org/2016/12/research-uptake-goes-comes/ 
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liberalisation will tend to outweigh protectionist tendencies). Implementation of the TFA and 
AfCFTA therefore provides an entry point through which international development partners can 
engage in supporting key private and public sector institutions collectively rather than as 
individual entities anchored around the two principle imperatives of collaboration and oversight.  
This Review points to the national (and regional) significance of establishing and operating 
National Trade Facilitation Committees and joint border arrangements. This recognises their 
importance within the provisions of the TFA and AfCFTA in providing the focal point through 
which trade simplifications can be designed, actioned and monitored across government and 
with the private sector at a policy and operational level. It is also argued here that, as with the 
Kenya NTFC and Rwanda governance models, this can give a voice to Civil Society 
Organisations, entrepreneurs, transport and logistics and marginalised groups in the 
development of national trade policy. Moreover, it will contribute to the knowledge base of the 
NTFC ensuring it can remain relevant and able to respond positively to challenges and 
opportunities in the trade dynamic e.g. the existence of new trade barriers and the rise of e-
Commerce.  
All the suggested interventions listed below stem from an evaluation of the information gathered 
as part of this Review. Their relevance would be further substantiated through a Political 
Economy Analysis and where the opportunity exists for complementarity with other related 
development partner programmes (as mentioned on page 20):         
Intervention 1 - (strategic and policy level) – Support Ministries of Trade to develop an enabling 
environment for the operationalisation of NTFCs. This could include inter alia, TFA sensitisation 
workshops, development of robust legislation and governance arrangements that would ensure 
the vertical and horizontal integration of a trade reform activities. In parallel, develop a detailed 
and coherent multi-annual national trade facilitation plan linked to national development 
aspirations and specific TFA commitments. The plan would contain logically sequenced and 
interconnected interventions that are specific, measurable, time bound and accountable;  
Intervention 2 - The need to assess and address gaps in government institutional project 
management capacity at Ministerial, NTFC and agency level to enable multi-scoping and multi-
agency planning to be successfully managed; 
Intervention 3 – Assess and support Trade Ministry and border agencies with their institutional 
arrangements around succession planning to ensure knowledge and skills are retained within the 
organisation and can be further enhanced throughout the organisation (train-the-trainers, staff 
leaver exit interviews etc.);   
Intervention 4 – Recognising that new trade procedures could produce losers as well as winners 
in the process, support could be given to increase Ministry of Trade and NTFC capacity to 
conduct consultative processes as part of a structured and time-bound impact assessment to be 
undertaken before new policies and procedures are introduced;      
Intervention 5 - Preparing the NTFCs to design and deliver discreet programmes of Trade 
Facilitation related support to key bodies within its stakeholder orbit (as part of an structured 
outreach programme) e.g.: TFA sensitisation workshops including metropolitan and provincial 
roadshows; professional training to customs brokers; improving access to information products to 
support greater levels of informed compliance targeted at important industry sectors and 
marginalised groups, (informal traders, women owned enterprises, SMEs); linking innovative 
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traders/entrepreneurs to sources of export finance and opportunities for building global value 
chains based on national value added input;   
Intervention 6 – Enabling (including financing) NTFCs to engage in (exchange visits) peer-to-
peer learning, cooperation and knowledge exchange with other partner country NTFC (e.g. within 
and beyond RECs where there is mutual interest on expanding trade);        
Intervention 7 – Increasing capacity of NTFCs to optimise the collection and evaluation of 
disaggregated data on trade facilitation performance (e.g. by gender and business and 
commodity type) as part of monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of new TFA 
procedures, the performance of road transit corridors and where such data can inform and refine 
government trade policy at the strategic level;   
Intervention 8 – Increase capacity of the border agency internal audit and National Audit Office 
function to increase oversight and accountability for the manner in which local managers and 
staff are implementing trade facilitation reform measures.  This recognises that the TFA itself is 
largely silent on corruption in which case, audit can serve as an additional assurance tool (where 
the political economy allows it to be) in rooting out maleficence and for identifying needed 
improvements in management practices. This is especially true if the performance auditors 
combine forces with fraud investigators, forensic accountants and law enforcement officials114;   
Intervention 9 – Trial the introduction of UK National Decision Model methodology (SAFCORM) 
for border agencies as a means of introducing greater levels of accountability for operational 
managers and reduce the possibility for arbitrary decisions and misuse of statutory powers e.g. 
involving the granting of duty exemptions; confiscation of goods, issuing of penalties and fines to 
traders, and where it is necessary to enforce a formal code of ethics within use in a Government 
department; 
Intervention 10 – Provide legal support in drawing up detailed secondary legislation to support 
primary legislation. This would be necessary not only in bringing greater efficiency, clarity and 
transparency to the way border agencies carry out their function but also where it would another 
requirement to strengthen accountability and the role of the internal/national audit function; 
Intervention 11 - Support analysis or research conducted by pro-development elites e.g. CSOs 
that can help increase their influence in policy debates, and persuade powerful political elite 
actors (entrepreneurs, academia, middle classes) to enter into alliance;   
Intervention 12 - Support extending the mandate and involvement of NTFCs to consult on, 
construct policies and monitor transport issues that reduce the transaction costs affecting 
international movements of goods. This would could include creating a coherent and interlinked 
national logistics Master Plan linked to a Trade Facilitation Roadmap.  
  
                                                   
114 Ibid 7 page 352 
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